



Art and Cognition Workshops



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·Nicolas Bullot
·Zeimbekis John
·Gloria Origgi

Guest Panel

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·Sylvie Allouche
·Daniel Andler
·Noga Arikha
·John Armstrong
·Sarah Bendaoud
·Paul Bloom
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·Barbara Tversky
·Jeffrey M. Zacks

The Department of Cognitive Studies at the Ecole Normale Supérieure organizes on this page a series of workshops on Art and Cognition. Each month, new papers will be open to discussion on a specific issue.

Discussion is open to all who wish to contribute and the forum is moderated. A bibliography and a list of links are also available on the site by clicking on [bibliography](#) and [links](#)

The current workshop explores the issue of:

Pictures in Cognition and Science

Pictures are non-linguistic external representations; as such, they can exploit the fineness of grain that normally comes with perceptual acquaintance, as opposed to verbal description. But how does this distinctive trait of pictures translate into a form of meaning? What is the role of concepts and depth-perception in understanding pictures? What is the semantic status of perceiving images while having the multimodal experience of films or virtual simulations? (Topic I) Beyond such questions, how do we make use of pictures? The conference will concentrate on the use of pictures in science, be they drawings, diagrams or photographs. Pictures are genuine vehicles of scientific content, but the reasons why they play such an indispensable role are poorly understood. Sometimes, pictures are data. Does this mean that the observation of pictures has the same epistemic value as the observation of natural scenes? Can pictures be more than cognitive facilitators in scientific contexts? Can they be parts of arguments, or are arguments strictly linguistic? How can they depict (parts of) theoretical models? (Topic II)

A previous edition of an [Art and Cognition Workshop](#) is archived on this site.

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papers open for discussion

Dual Recognition of Depth and Dependent Seeing

John Dilworth

An explanation of the seeing of depth both in reality and in pictures requires a dual content theory of visual recognition. In addition, there are two necessary conditions on genuine seeing of depth-related content. First, the right kinds of dependence relations must hold between a physical picture, its content and its perceiver, and second, the perceiver must be in an appropriate, functionally defined perceptual state.

Date of publication: 6 June 2005

Drawing in the Social Sciences: Lithic Illustration

Dominic Lopes

Images are used in science to present data. Taking the physical and life sciences as paradigms, one might suppose that machine-made images always serve this purposes better than hand-made images. A broader view of the use of scientific images, which includes the social sciences, shows this supposition to be false. Archaeological drawings of human artifacts, such as stone tools, are preferred to photographs. The explanation of this is that the human drawing system is an observational tool with special powers.

Date of publication: 23 May 2005

papers soon to be open for discussion

Scientific Reasoning, Mental Models, and Depiction

Laura Perini

Figures seem to play an important role in scientific reasoning, but the nature of reasoning with images is not yet understood. In this paper I will draw on the literature on mental models to provide some insight into the reasoning that scientists apply when working with visual representations.

Date of publication: 13 June 2005

Any Way You Slice It: The Viewpoint Independence of Pictorial Content

John Kulvicki

We understand pictures irrespective of the point from which we view them, even though pictures depict things from a point of view. Philosophers and psychologists tend to claim that we somehow compensate for odd viewing angles when viewing a picture. I show that once we understand the complexities of pictorial content, compensation becomes unnecessary.

Date of publication: 20 June 2005

Cross-Modal Effects in Motion Picture Perception: Toward an Interactive Theory of Film

Mark Rollins

Date of publication: 27 June 2005



Model, Reference and Meaning of an Engraving: The Case of Aldrovandi's Bat
Laurent Pinon

Date of publication: 30 June 2005

archived papers and discussions

Sulla finzione necessaria

Maria Bettetini

An ethics of seeing, of reading, of listening would allow us to distinguish between the necessary "fiction" intrinsic to any artwork and the further degrees of fiction that arise out of its communicative use. A neo-platonic approach to an ethics of seeing.

Date of publication: 28 April 2005

From Original to Copy and Back Again

James Elkins

Historians have been largely silent during the debates on Goodman's claim that one cannot distinguish an authentic from a forged painting by "merely looking". This paper opens the limited dialogue between art history and aesthetics by exploring the ways that forgeries, copies, and originals function within historical and critical discourse. Instead of comparing authentic and inauthentic, I will be comparing imperceptible difference with immediately obvious difference.

Date of publication: 22 November 2004

Replicative forgery

Zeimbekis John

I argue that there is no distinction between allographic and autographic representations. One consequence of this is that replicative forgeries have the same aesthetic and artistic value as originals, and are accurate records of actions. I end with some reflections on the pragmatic structure of forgery.

Date of publication: 2 November 2004

Forgery and Reproduction

Gregory Currie

Forgery needs to be distinguished from reproduction. It is sometimes said that the aesthetically relevant question raised by the existence of artistic forgery is whether a picture visually indistinguishable from a valuable picture is itself valuable--to the same or to any degree. Yet I suggest that one may have no qualms, aesthetic or of any other kinds, about the honest reproduction of art while at the same time thinking that forgery is a bad thing.

Date of publication: 18 October 2004

The ontology of forgery

Roger Pouivet

Forgery doesn't have an autonomous existence, because it depends on a mistaken, intentionally misleading, attribution. The mode of existence of forgery is parasitic on authenticity. Thus the right question is not "What is a forgery?" but "What can be the object of a forgery?" Roger Pouivet argues here that Nelson Goodman's most criticized distinction between *autographic* and *allographic* works of art provides a starting point for an ontology of forgery.

Date of publication: 4 October 2004

Authenticity in Art

Denis Dutton

Works of art possess what we may call *nominal authenticity*, defined simply as the correct identification of the origins, authorship, or provenance of an object, ensuring that an object of aesthetic experience is properly named. However, the concept of authenticity often connotes something else, having to do with an object's

character as a true expression of an individual's or a society's values and beliefs. This second sense of authenticity can be called *expressive authenticity*. The following discussion will summarize some of the problems surrounding nominal authenticity and will conclude with a general examination of expressive authenticity. This paper is excerpted from a longer version published in the *Oxford Handbook of Aesthetics*.
Date of publication: 15 September 2004